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The Damage of Debt 
Katherine Porter* 
“Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking;  
for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.”1 
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I. Introduction 
The debt burdens of Americans have grown tremendously in 
recent decades. For most Americans, income in real dollars has 
stagnated since the 1970s, but both unsecured and secured debt 
has marched sharply upward.2 About 15% of families spend more 
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 1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, at 9 (Martin Ostwald trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Publ’g Co. 1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 2. KEVIN T. LEICHT & SCOTT T. FITZGERALD, POSTINDUSTRIAL PEASANTS: 
THE ILLUSION OF MIDDLE-CLASS PROSPERITY 48 fig.3.1, 59 fig.3.6 (2007) (showing 
that while middle-class income has remained, on average, stagnant, household 
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than 40% of their after-tax income on debt payments.3 With 
inflation-adjusted borrowing at a current level more than ten 
times greater than it was fifty years ago,4 debt permeates the 
lives of American families.  
A significant proportion of households struggle to manage 
their debts. In the last decade, on average, more than one million 
consumer bankruptcy cases were filed annually.5 To put that 
number in context, one million bankruptcy cases means that, in 
2012, more women will go bankrupt than will divorce, and the 
annual number of freshly minted bankruptcy debtors will exceed 
the number of new college graduates.6 And the bankrupt are only 
a small subset of those struggling with debts.7 In 2006, one in 
seven families was contacted by a debt collector.8 The foreclosure 
crisis and the recession have only expanded the number of people 
struggling with debts. In 2010, more than one in eight Americans 
                                                                                                     
debt has increased dramatically). 
 3. See Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 
to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 
2009, at A1, A50 fig.18, A50–51 (noting that the number of families with debt 
“payments exceeding 40% of their incomes” rose to approximately “14.7 percent” 
in 2007). 
 4. See FED. RESERVE BD. S.F., U.S. HOUSEHOLD DELEVERAGING AND FUTURE 
CONSUMPTION GROWTH 1 fig.1 (2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/ 
publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-16.pdf (reporting that “the ratio of 
debt to personal disposable income” increased from “55% in 1960” to “133% in 
2007”). 
 5. In the twelve-month period ending September 2011, there were 
1,417,316 million nonbusiness filings. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 
Bankruptcy Statistics, www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptcystats.htm 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
In 2005 and 2006, the number of bankruptcies shows considerable variation 
from typical annual filings because of the anticipation and aftermath of new 
consumer bankruptcy legislation, the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (amending 
consumer bankruptcy law).  
 6. Cf. Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, 
Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 
21 (2002) (stating this same proposition in relation to projected 2003 filings).  
 7. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 
GEO. L.J. 289, 290 (2009) (“[O]nly a fraction of those in serious financial distress 
will ever file for bankruptcy.”). 
 8. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, 8, 10 (Summer 
2007), available at http://dajoi.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (“Today about one in every 
seven families in America is dealing with a debt collector.”). 
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was behind in their mortgage payments or in foreclosure.9 
Millions more have negative equity in their homes, with 
mortgage debts overwhelming their homes’ values.10 The 
exploding debt loads of American families have increased the 
phenomenon of unmanageable debt.  
Most efforts to study the financial distress of debt burdens 
focus on the bankrupt population.11 People who file for 
bankruptcy admit financial collapse, making a public declaration 
that they cannot pay their debts and that they need relief. 
Researchers and policymakers have decried the balance sheets of 
these bankrupt households. In 2007, the median bankrupt 
household owed nearly $34,000 in unsecured debt,12 an amount 
equal to nearly fifteen months of its income.13 Although debts 
have increased in the last two decades, an enduring characteristic 
of bankrupt families is that their debts dwarf their income and 
assets.14 Policy debates about consumer credit have seized on the 
                                                                                                     
 9. See 12% of Homeowners Behind on Mortgages, CBS NEWS (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/05/business/main4844773.shtml 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (“Twelve percent of all U.S. homeowners are behind 
in their mortgage payments [or] in foreclosure . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10. Sarah Bloom, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Legal 
Opportunities and Challenges in Crafting a Foreclosure Response (Oct. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20111004a. 
htm. 
 11. Although many who struggle with debts will not file for bankruptcy, 
bankruptcy cases are particularly useful to researchers for several reasons. 
Borrowing is a private act, and debt is infrequently measured in surveys, 
particularly compared with the ubiquity of income. Bankruptcy filings are, 
however, public and permit one to identify the population with excessive debts. 
See Mann & Porter, supra note 7, at 296 (noting the difficulty of identifying 
debt-distressed households).  
 12. See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 app. III at 404 
(2008) (noting that the median amount of unsecured debt owed by households in 
2007 was $33,882). I am a co-author of this paper and an investigator in the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project. More information on the other team members, 
methodology, and findings of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project is available in 
the prefatory footnote to the above article and in Appendix I: Detailed 
Methodology. Id. at 349 n.*, app. I at 387–98.  
 13. See id. at 373 (“By 2007, the median household owed nearly 15 months 
of income to unsecured creditors . . . .”).  
 14. See id. at 365, 366 fig.5 (“[F]or households in bankruptcy . . . [a]s total 
assets rise, so do total debts, increasing from about $47,400 in 1981 to $87,300 
in 2007.”). 
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bankruptcy data as evidence of the high levels of indebtedness in 
America.  
The debt metric pervades bankruptcy lawmaking. The means 
test added to bankruptcy law in 2005 calculates whether a 
household could repay a certain fraction of its debts to determine 
whether a household deserves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
discharge.15 The cost of bankruptcy to creditors is measured by 
dollars of debt discharged.16 Bankruptcy’s success or failure is 
measured by the fraction of debtors that achieve a discharge of 
debt,17 and generosity of the system is quantified by the types of 
debt deemed ineligible for discharge.18 In the bankruptcy and 
consumer protection context, the conceptual space of financial 
distress has been defined along a single dimension: debt, or its 
kissing cousin, wealth. The problem of overindebtedness occurs 
when consumers’ debts exceed certain financial benchmarks. 
Negative net worth, high debt-to-income ratios, or heavy debt 
service burdens all capture when debts overwhelm assets or when 
debt is unlikely to be serviceable on current and expected 
                                                                                                     
 15. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (stating that courts will 
“presume abuse” if a debtor’s current monthly income, after it is reduced by 
certain calculations and multiplied by sixty, “is not less than the lesser of . . . 25 
percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case”). 
 16. See 152 CONG. REC. S10647 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-09-29/pdf/CREC-2006-09-29-pt1-PgS 
10647.pdf (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (calculating bankruptcy losses 
saved through the 2005 bankruptcy reform by multiplying an average figure of 
$41,000 debt discharged by the number of filings in 2005 versus 2006). Such 
calculations frequently fail to consider what portion of the debt would be 
uncollectible even in the absence of bankruptcy and, thus, overstate the harm to 
creditors from bankruptcy relief.  
 17. See Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: What Is “Success” in 
Chapter 13? Why Should We Care?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 20, 67 
(noting that discharge after completion of a repayment plan is the dominant 
debtor-oriented measure of the success of Chapter 13). For an example of this 
approach, see Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and 
Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 504–05 (2006) 
(measuring “debtor fresh start in Chapter 13 based on discharge and refiling 
rates”).  
 18. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the 
United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 35–38 (2001) (discussing the then proposed 
reforms in availability of discharges in what became the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23 (2006)).  
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income.19 Although these measures are more likely to capture 
situations when debt is imposing harms than simply tallying 
dollars of debt, all financial metrics are limited in their 
usefulness to measure the cognate harms of overindebtedness. 
Financial measures may not reveal when debt becomes harmful, 
and they certainly do not illuminate the nonfinancial harms of 
overindebtedness.  
The singular focus on dollars of debt has obscured the full 
purpose of legal intervention in consumer credit markets. For 
example, the point of bankruptcy is not to erase debt for the sake 
of the act itself. Debt is merely a proxy of the harms of financial 
distress, just as income and assets are proxies of financial 
success. Similarly, when the law regulates credit on consumer-
protection grounds, the intent is not to prevent borrowing itself, 
but rather to reduce or to eliminate the harms that can result 
from unmanageable debt. The problem to be solved is not 
overindebtedness, but rather the serious and real harms that 
accompany overindebtedness. But what are the harms of 
excessive debt? How are they manifested? How severe or 
enduring are they? How can those harms be measured?  
This Article is a first step in the larger endeavor of 
answering those questions. I articulate two challenges to the 
current research on excessive debt. The first critique accepts debt 
as an appropriate measure of welfare but highlights the lack of 
empirical work on the consequences of excessive debt on 
individuals and society. The principal shortcoming is a failure to 
assess the actual problem to be solved—the externalities and 
costs of debt. Both legal and other social science scholarship has 
paid little attention to this issue, even as the debt burdens of 
Americans have ballooned. The second critique posits that debt 
itself is an impoverished measure of diminished well-being. 
Drawing on poverty economics and its concern with human 
capabilities, I make a parallel between the limitations of income 
to measure poverty and the limitations of debt to measure 
financial distress. I identify ways in which debt may alter 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Edward Wolff & Ajit Zacharias, The Impact of Wealth Inequality on 
Economic Well-Being, CHALLENGE, July–Aug. 2007, at 65, 66 (noting that 
“negative net worth” is synonymous with indebtedness, and that “carrying 
substantial amounts of debt implies a diversion of household income toward 
debt service”). 
984 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979 (2012) 
individuals’ endowments and preferences and how society may 
condition opportunity for those mired in debt. I suggest a 
multidimensional framework for studying debt that incorporates 
study of how debt may affect elements of welfare, such as 
education, health, work, housing, and the ability to participate in 
social life. These harms of overindebtedness, which can limit 
what individuals can do and be, are obscured when researchers 
solely measure the problem of debt using a dollar metric. I 
conclude the Article with examples of how empirical research 
might assess how overindebtedness limits peoples’ capabilities to 
achieve and sustain well-being.  
Before turning to these two concerns with the existing work 
on overindebtedness, I pause to articulate how documenting the 
harms of debt could inform theory and policy in the consumer 
credit area. The initial goal is to describe the damage of 
unmanageable debt, either measured as externalities of debt 
itself or within a multidimensional space of well-being. These 
empirical findings would have implications for both ex ante and ex 
post policies on consumer credit, including bankruptcy. 
Regardless of their orientation, all existing theories of 
bankruptcy that attempt to justify a discharge of debt for 
individuals rest, to some degree, on eliminating the harms of 
financial distress.20 For example, utilitarian theories justify a 
discharge on the basis that debt-burdened individuals are 
discouraged from socially productive activity such as maximizing 
earnings.21 Yet, there is no evidence that excessive debt actually 
produces such effects. Similarly, the rehabilitationist view posits 
that the purpose of debt relief is to rectify the harms to 
                                                                                                     
 20. See generally HEIDI M. HURD & RALPH BRUBAKER, DEBTS AND THE 
DEMANDS OF CONSCIENCE: THE VIRTUE OF BANKRUPTCY (forthcoming 2012) 
(collecting and critiquing existing theories of bankruptcy). Hurd and Brubaker 
develop a new theory for discharge based on “aretaic duties.” Id. at 122. Even in 
this paradigm, however, the aretaic duty arises because it is not virtuous to 
extract suffering from those who are in a “thoroughly miserable and pitiful 
state.” Id. at 126. Such a determination requires empirical knowledge of 
whether excessive debt brings about such harms.  
 21. See id. at 30–31 (noting that utilitarians believe that “the goal of 
personal discharge law must be to improve debtors’ future economic functioning 
so as to minimize the economic impact of debt on society as a whole”). 
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individuals from excessive debt.22 Yet, without knowing the 
nature of the damage of debt, such theories lack imperative.  
Understanding the harms of excessive debt also aids in 
assessing whether existing systems for debt relief are adequate. 
A robust definition of the problem the law seeks to solve is a 
precursor to evaluating the efficacy of legal solutions. Shifting the 
definitional space from the narrow financial measure of dollars of 
debt to a multidimensional space for debt that embodies an 
expansive definition of well-being may reveal limitations of the 
bankruptcy discharge as a remedy. For example, I hypothesize 
that an episode of severe debt-induced financial distress, such as 
those experienced by bankrupt households, may make it difficult 
for individuals to seek new employment or may result in lasting 
health consequences. These harms to productivity and well-being 
continue after individuals discharge their debts in bankruptcy. 
Thus, when the harm is measured as too many dollars of debt, 
the discharge is a resounding success. But when the harm is 
measured along multiple dimensions, the discharge may be an 
incomplete or inadequate solution. Moreover, it is difficult to 
make accurate calculi about the costs and benefits of credit 
regulation without understanding the individual and collective 
harms of unmanageable debt.  
To be sure, the harms of credit restrictions may outweigh the 
harms of excessive debt, and the appropriate balance may elude 
regulators. Such determinations should be informed by evidence, 
however, and not by conjecture or anecdote. By developing a 
theoretical frame to measure the harms of overindebtedness, I 
hope to guide empirical research that is sensitive to the economic 
and social consequences of unmanageable debt.  
II. Traditional Constructs of Debt Problems 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 
bankruptcy policy has been racked with allegations that 
consumer bankruptcy relief is too generous.23 Such concerns could 
                                                                                                     
 22. See id. at 92 (noting that rehabilitationists seek to ensure “that debtors 
are restored to a position of legal, moral, and psychological equality that allows 
them to rewrite their lives anew”). 
 23. See, e.g., Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy 
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have motivated studies of excessive debt harms. As I posit above, 
it is difficult to assess whether bankruptcy is an adequate 
solution to unmanageable debt without a grasp on the problems 
that may accompany unmanageable debt. Yet, there is scant 
research, particularly on American families, that assesses the 
consequences of overindebtedness.  
The debates on bankruptcy, often ferocious in the years 
leading up to the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act,24 took a very different approach. 
Rather than gauging the generosity of debt relief against the 
harms of debt, the debate focused on fears of abuse. This drove 
researchers toward debating the causes of bankruptcy and trying 
to assess whether people who filed for bankruptcy had the means 
to repay their debts. For example, the groundbreaking empirical 
work of Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook 
identified job problems, medical problems, and family break up as 
the principal causes of bankruptcy.25 They documented the high 
debts and low incomes of bankrupt people and the fact that the 
financial profiles of bankrupt households were more dismal with 
successive iterations of their research, despite conjectures that 
the stigma of bankruptcy was declining.26 Advocates of 
constricting bankruptcy relief countered with anecdotes of high-
income debtors, concerns about the moral hazards of debt relief, 
and narrower approaches to determining the causality of 
bankruptcy.27  
                                                                                                     
Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & ECON. 419, 423–24 (1984) (describing certain 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 as “generous,” thus “mak[ing] 
bankruptcy a more attractive option for many debtors”). 
 24. See 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2006) (amending consumer bankruptcy law). 
 25. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 25 (2000) 
[hereinafter FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS] (finding that as “medical costs” increase, 
“job security” becomes more fragile, and the divorce rate “remains at historic 
highs,” the bankruptcy filing rate of middle-class consumers has increased as 
well).  
 26. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 233–39 
(2006) [hereinafter Less Stigma] (noting that, from 1981 to 2001, the “total debt-
to-income ratio rose from 30% of [annual] income to 63%”).  
 27.  See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before 
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Both sides of the debate largely ignored the consequences of 
financial distress in favor of contesting causality. Embedded in 
arguments about the deservingness of people for debt relief was 
an assumption that financial metrics adequately captured the 
problem of financial distress. In this view, the central question 
became whether households had enough dollars of income to pay 
off their dollars of debt.28 Such a calculation might screen 
particular people for bankruptcy eligibility, but it cannot itself 
justify debt relief even for those with the gravest inability to 
repay their debts. Relief from unmanageable debt must be 
motivated by the harms attendant to the debt, not merely by the 
fact that that debt exceeds a dollar benchmark.  
In the last few decades, there have been virtually no 
empirical studies of the consequences of excessive debt. Given the 
changes in family structure, labor markets, and access to credit 
since the 1970s, the conclusions of older studies may not describe 
the current environment. When harms of debt have been 
recognized, the scholarly treatment of them has been limited. 
Even accepting debt as an appropriate measure for the harm of 
financial distress, scholars have barely begun to measure the 
costs of debt. Conjectures that debt could create externalities 
                                                                                                     
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 58 (1999) (statement of Rep. Steven Rothman) 
(espousing the need to “reinstill a sense of personal responsibility”); Edith H. 
Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 
FINAL REPORT, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 1123, 1134 (2000) 
(quoting Congressman Pete Sessions in stating that “bankruptcy is ‘for some 
people . . . just another tool of financial management’”); Gail L. Heriot, 
Misdiagnosis: A Comment on Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy 
and the Media Publicity Surrounding It, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 229, 234 (2005) 
(criticizing a study for its construction of “medically related” bankruptcy). 
 28.  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF 
FOUR REPORTS ON CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS’ ABILITY TO PAY 3 (1999), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99103.pdf (analyzing reports that “address a 
major public policy issue—the amount of income that those who file for personal 
bankruptcy have available to pay their debts”); Marianne B. Culhane & 
Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only 
Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 671–74 (2005) (describing the means test 
as measuring whether a debtor has “enough disposable income . . . to fund a 
workable Chapter 13 plan”); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for 
Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 178 (“Means-testing . . . embodies the 
concept that well-off, income-earning debtors should be required to repay what 
they can to their unsecured, nonpriority creditors.”).  
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have not translated to momentum for empirical study. I describe 
the existing research largely to glean areas for future empirical 
investigation rather than to document significant existing 
knowledge.  
To at least some degree, scholars addressing the purpose of 
consumer bankruptcy have had to confront the consequences of 
financial distress.29 Several authors have hypothesized that 
financial distress from debt imposes social losses and have 
posited that bankruptcy relief may curb those externalities.30 
Writing thirty years ago, John Weistart noted a possible economic 
justification for liberalized access to bankruptcy discharge:  
The point to be investigated is whether excessive debt, with its 
attendant pressure on family and emotional stability and job 
security, does not so inhibit productivity that there would be a 
net social gain from terminating costly collection actions, 
excusing the debts, and giving the poorer-but-wiser debtor a 
second chance.31  
Thomas Jackson echoed this utilitarian approach, hypothesizing 
that debtors who cannot pay off their debts from their anticipated 
income would revert to leisure rather than work.32 The 
externality arises because “the social cost of lost productivity 
exceeds the debtor’s personal loss in shifting to leisure.”33 This is 
perhaps the most commonly theorized harm of debt, often 
                                                                                                     
 29. This confrontation results in efforts to justify a discharge of debt as a 
crucial element of bankruptcy. A consumer bankruptcy system has other 
purposes, including maximizing recovery to creditors, reducing inefficiencies in 
individual collection activity, and ensuring a particular order of distribution to 
creditors. These purposes may be justified on bases other than individual or 
social harms of debt.  
 30. See, e.g., THE GRIFFITHS COMM’N ON PERS. DEBT, WHAT PRICE CREDIT? 13 
(2005), available at http://centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/client/downloads/What 
PriceCredit.pdf (describing how “personal household debt has become a major 
issue of public concern”); Mann & Porter, supra note 7, at 296 (describing the 
“social losses” experienced by “households in distress” from debt). 
 31. John C. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 111 (1977).  
 32. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1421 (1985) (predicting that, in some cases, debtors “may 
shift from work to leisure” if they will never be able to repay their debts with 
personal income).  
 33. Id. 
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expressed as a problem of human capital.34 The normative goal of 
a bankruptcy discharge is to “redeploy” such capital by changing 
a debtor’s incentives to work.35 Put more colorfully, “[S]ociety as a 
whole also loses when moping bankrupt debtors are distracted 
from working at their highest and best use level of productivity 
because they are instead coping with financial ruin.”36 These 
scholars may be correct that excessive debt alters a debtor’s 
productivity and labor efforts, but they have not calculated such 
harms. I am disposed to agree with the utilitarian insight that 
debt probably alters economic incentives and creates social loss. 
Indeed, the hypothesis of this Article is that such damage occurs. 
But to date, there is little evidence of how overindebtedness may 
affect labor processes and productivity.37  
Perhaps more importantly, theories framed on utilitarian 
terms such as “redeployment of human capital” and 
“externalities” may mask the complex harms of financial 
distress.38 I discern two problems. First, defining debt as the 
agent of harm does not illuminate the causal pathway of debt’s 
negative effects. Debt may operate on incentives, but it is the 
incentives themselves that alter an individual’s behavior. 
                                                                                                     
 34. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION 
OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 50 (2006) [hereinafter CHARGING AHEAD] (“Another 
category commonly noted is the loss to the economy of the diminished 
productivity of people in financial distress.”); Richard M. Hynes, Non-
Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 340–43 (describing the 
“serious” possibility that debtors may forgo “productive labor” and become “a 
drain on the public fisc” or cease “to contribute to such fisc through taxation”). 
 35. See Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing 
Rates, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 225, 242 (Johanna Niemi, Iain Ramsay & William 
Whitford eds., 2009) [hereinafter Making Sense] (“[S]ociety gains considerably 
from the discharge [of debt], because it is central to the redeployment of the 
debtor’s human capital.”). 
 36. John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 412.  
 37. One example of such work is Jinhee Kim & E. Thomas Garman, 
Financial Stress and Absenteeism: An Empirically Derived Model, 14 J. FIN. 
COUNSELING & PLAN., no. 1, 2003 at 31 (finding that financial stress, which 
includes concerns regarding money owed, is positively associated with 
absenteeism from work).  
 38. See Making Sense, supra note 35, at 242–43 (discussing how debt 
discharge allows a debtor to redeploy its human capital); Hynes, supra note 34, 
at 340–43 (discussing externalities that may stem from debt discharge). 
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Anthony Kronman perhaps has come closest to recognizing such 
effects:  
One reason for giving the debtor a fresh start is to counteract 
the self-hatred he may feel, having mortgaged his entire 
future in a series of past decisions he now regrets. Whatever 
its macroeconomic function, the bankruptcy discharge has a 
moral purpose as well—to restore to the debtor some measure 
of confidence in his capacity to arrange his future as he 
wishes, free from the dead hand of the past. Without such 
confidence, the debtor may lose even that minimum of self-
respect that is a condition for his taking an interest in himself 
and his own life.39  
Similarly, Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook 
have noted that bankrupt people experience “self-loathing and 
humiliation in recognition of what their spending habits have 
brought them to.”40 Although couched in rehabilitationist terms, 
there is a behavioralist-utilitarian perspective in the 
observations: excessive debt could alter a debtor’s decision 
making in ways that lower utility. For example, debtors could 
assess financial risk differently in the aftermath of 
overindebtedness. Such perceptions could lead to enduring 
changes in a debtor’s labor market participation and allocation of 
their human capital. The bankruptcy literature, which takes debt 
itself as the operative harm, obscures such effects. The 
immediacy of discharge as a legal remedy leads to a conclusion 
that debt relief produces instant improvement in productivity. 
However, excessive debt may create complex and enduring harms 
that do not abate in direct proportion to a reduction in debt.  
The second shortcoming of the utilitarian lens is that it may 
impose unduly narrow and abstract limitations on the types of 
harm it “sees.” The rational actor is also a person with a psyche—
a spouse, a parent, or a social actor. Focusing on the amount of an 
individual’s debt seems to have reinforced an atomistic view that 
identifies a single person—the borrower—as the locus of harm. 
But the harms of debt may reverberate from the indebted 
individual to that person’s family, workplace, and larger 
community. An individualistic approach focused on dollars of debt 
                                                                                                     
 39. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763, 785–86 (1983).  
 40. FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 25, at 139.  
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makes it difficult to discern the full range of social loss associated 
with excessive debt, including harms suffered by those who do not 
have any debt themselves. Scholars have noted that more 
intimate externalities could arise from overindebtedness, as when 
family members or friends depend on the debtor for support.41 
Implicit here is the idea that financial distress alters a debtor’s 
willingness or ability to support such dependents, harming these 
dependents’ “financial or psychological well-being.”42 Ronald 
Mann has written that “children and spouses suffer substantially 
in the event of financial distress of a wage-earning spouse.”43 Yet, 
the work he cites to support that statement is thin.44 Professors 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook hypothesized that economic 
difficulties—in particular, the uncertainty and reversal that can 
accompany unmanageable debt—may lead to marital strain and 
divorce.45 Ten years and several studies of bankrupt families have 
elapsed, but the causal pathway between divorce and debt 
remains murky.46  
Sociological literature offers a modest amount of empirical 
research on families who struggle to make ends meet. These 
studies are often concerned with people with low socioeconomic 
status, who may also be in financial distress. The work rarely 
focuses on debt or financial metrics, but instead, is usually 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 1419 (arguing that “[f]amily members 
and . . . close friends who depend on another individual for support need [debt] 
discharge to safeguard” their own interests).  
 42. Id.; see also Pottow, supra note 36, at 411 (“The debtor’s family and 
others in her circle of intimates suffer too, experiencing the very tangible 
psychological and monetizable costs when a debtor endures general default.”). 
 43. CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 34, at 49. 
 44. Id. at 49–50 n.18 (citing Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in 
Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985) and Richard M. Hynes, Non-
Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301). 
 45. See Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt 
Management in Financially Stressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS 
THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 136–53 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) [hereinafter BROKE]; 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 25, at 195 (“A steady state of little money 
may not contribute to marital disruptions so much as sharp drops, 
uncertainties, and sudden reversals.”).  
 46. See Jonathan D. Fisher & Angela C. Lyons, Till Debt Do Us Part: A 
Model of Divorce and Personal Bankruptcy, 4 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 35, 48 
(2006) (“[F]uture research on marital disruption needs to more carefully model 
the role that financial distress plays within a marriage . . . .”).  
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anchored in the traditional sociological construct of class. 
Although class may have a powerful connection to debt, the 
existing literature does not explore such relationships.47 Thus, 
the social science literature is primarily useful to prompt 
consideration of whether the harms of excessive debt may mimic 
or diverge from the harms of poverty, working-class membership, 
or downward socioeconomic mobility. While many people 
accumulate debts after an income or job loss, the experience of 
debt carries with it a set of experiences that are distinct from the 
financial distress of poverty.48 For example, debt collectors and 
garnishment are uniquely a function of debt.49 They have no 
direct association with income, poverty, or working-class status. 
Borrowing, even for necessary consumption like food, has a 
voluntary aspect to it. This may result in different stigmatization 
or internalized blame of debt-induced financial distress compared 
to poverty. Similarly, what I have termed the “off-label” use of 
credit scores for employment and rental housing may lead to 
lasting labor market and educational constraints (via public 
school access tied to housing) from excessive debt.50 Such harms 
originate differently than the consequences of low income or a 
                                                                                                     
 47. A few scholars have focused on wealth—see LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN 
AMERICA: TRENDS IN WEALTH INEQUALITY 259–62 (2000) (describing the 
distribution, ownership, and accumulation of wealth for middle- and upper-class 
households); DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, 
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 43–44, 53 (1999) (describing “possible conditions 
that foster black-white differences in wealth accumulation”)—but this work has 
primarily been concerned with asset accumulation and not debt.  
 48. I use the term “poverty” here to refer to a sustained condition of 
financial hardship resulting from low or nonexistent income.  
 49. In fact, some types of debt collection are relatively uncommon 
experiences for the lowest-income households because of asset and income 
exemptions from coercive collection. 
 50. See Katherine Porter, More Supreme Court Action on Credit Issues, 
CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 28, 2006, 12:39 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/ 
creditslips/2006/09/more_supreme_co.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (describing 
“off-label” uses of credit reports as “those not concerning a decision to grant 
credit—such as a decision to insure someone”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Deborah Thorne, Personal Bankruptcy and the Credit Report: 
Conflicting Mechanisms of Social Mobility, J. POVERTY, Dec. 1, 2007, at 23, 28 
(“Given the breadth of information that credit reports provide . . . potential 
employers, owners of rental housing, utility companies, and insurance agents 
typically request copies of applicants’ credit reports.”).  
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loss of socioeconomic status and may differ in magnitude and 
duration.  
Notwithstanding this uncertainty about the similarity of 
different types of financial hardship, the externalities of debt 
almost certainly have at least some parallels to poverty, 
downward mobility, and low socioeconomic status. The social 
science work on those problems points to an array of harms that 
extends beyond the productivity and familial harms mentioned in 
the legal literature.51 The most pointed work on the negative 
consequences of debt is a chapter in David Caplovitz’s study of 
debtors sued for delinquent consumer debts in 1967.52 He finds 
that many debtors report experiencing job loss, health problems, 
or marital strain because of their “debt troubles.”53 This research 
provides support for the idea that debt may lead to a variety of 
harms, although both the legal landscape and the structure of the 
credit markets have changed dramatically since 1967. 
Additionally, the sample of defendants in debt-collection lawsuits 
may not be representative of those with unmanageable debts. 
Creditors ostensibly choose to sue debtors who they believe have 
income or assets and do not sue those who are judgment proof.54 
But most of those who file for bankruptcy—a group 
overwhelmingly mired in debt—have not been sued, garnished, or 
had property taken.55 The population of people with 
unmanageable debt is likely both different and much larger than 
the population of debt-collection defendants.  
David Caplovitz extended his work on financial distress in a 
comprehensive study, Making Ends Meet: How Families Cope 
                                                                                                     
 51. See supra notes 28–46 and accompanying text (critiquing works that 
describe the effects of debt on family and productivity). 
 52. See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN 
DEFAULT 273–89 (1974) (describing the “impact of the debt problem” on various 
aspects of a debtor’s life).  
 53. See id. at 274–89 (finding that “debt troubles” can be “extremely costly 
and debilitating” due to their effects on a debtor’s employment, health, and 
marriage). 
 54. See Mann & Porter, supra note 7, at 309–10 (describing various 
difficulties that creditors encounter when trying to collect from debtors with no 
assets). 
 55. See id. at 308–10 (describing how, under Chapters 7 and 13, debtors 
escape litigation, garnishment, and foreclosure). 
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with Inflation and Recession.56 Using interview data from four 
urban areas, he offers a detailed portrait of how households were 
affected by, and responded to, inflation and recession in the late 
1970s.57 The study examined a cross-section of households, 
including those who reported few, if any, actual negative effects.58 
Nonetheless, his insights on how households respond to a 
generalized economic downturn are intriguing and suggest 
consequences that might accompany debt-induced financial 
distress.59 In particular, his identified association between 
financial well-being and mental health could be replicated in the 
context of studying the harms of debt.60  
Other researchers have used the traditional sociological lens 
of class to study financial hardship. Lillian Rubin’s interview-
based studies examine working-class families, defined by 
occupation.61 She focuses on how the low incomes and other 
outcomes (such as limited control of one’s job prospects) that 
accompany working-class occupations strain the happiness and 
stability of family life.62 She describes the ways that financial 
                                                                                                     
 56. See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW FAMILIES COPE WITH 
INFLATION AND RECESSION 253 (1979) (finding that “inflation and recession did 
hurt many families” throughout the 1970s, but that “there was no wholesale 
breakdown of social or psychological life because of these economic setbacks”). 
 57. See id. at 11 (studying “four major urban areas” to determine how 
families were “affected by and have responded to the twin calamities of inflation 
and recession”). 
 58. See id. at 22–36 (finding that mostly “minority groups and the poor” 
reported being affected by the negative aspects of the recession, such as 
“reduced income and fear of job loss”). 
 59. See id. at 91–157 (describing the consequences of inflation and the 
recession for various classes of families and the strategies that they used to cope 
with these problems, including “trying to maintain [their] standard of living by 
going into debt”). 
 60. See id. at 155 (finding that “[t]hose whose incomes had fallen behind 
rising prices were much more likely to show mental stress . . . than those whose 
incomes kept up with rising prices”). 
 61. See, e.g., LILLIAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE: AMERICA’S 
WORKING-CLASS SPEAKS ABOUT THE FAMILY, THE ECONOMY, RACE, AND ETHNICITY 
30–31 (1994) [hereinafter FAULT LINE] (defining the “working-class” as 
individuals “who work at the lower levels of the manufacturing and service 
sectors of the economy”); LILLIAN B. RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE 
WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 10 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter WORLDS OF PAIN] 
(describing use of “intensive interviews” to conduct her research on working-
class families). 
 62. See WORLDS OF PAIN, supra note 61, at xxiv–xxv, 204–07, 210 
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pressures harm parenting and spousal relationships, for example, 
by damaging ideas of self-worth.63 In a later work, she 
emphasized the goal of documenting the “economic and social 
realities that make family life so difficult today and that so often 
destroy it.”64  
A decade later, Katherine Newman made a similar 
exploration of the middle class. Her ethnography, Falling from 
Grace, documented the reactions of middle-class Americans who 
were experiencing downward economic mobility.65 Newman 
focuses on four types of middle-class households that experience 
income loss, including unemployed managers and executives and 
divorced mothers.66 She identifies the cultural frames that these 
groups of people use to understand their economic dislocation.67 
Her work offers a rich description of how individuals understand 
financial distress, but it does not attempt to measure the harms 
of such distress beyond individuals’ own struggles to make sense 
of their downward mobility.68 As a result, her work largely fails to 
articulate any normative or consequentialist explanation of why 
society should mitigate or prevent financial distress.  
The existing work provides little knowledge about the 
contemporary harms of excessive debt. Sociologists have largely 
overlooked debt as a peculiar source of harm, eschewing it in 
                                                                                                     
(describing both the economic realities of working-class life and their effects on 
the quality of life for working-class families). 
 63. See id. at 55 (stating that society’s “acceptance and transmission of 
definitions of self-worth that are tied to material accomplishments and 
acquisitions” have inflicted significant injuries “upon the working-class”). 
 64. FAULT LINE, supra note 61, at 234. 
 65. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS ix–x (1988) (studying the 
“experience of downward mobility” for middle-class families and the “cultural 
forms” that emerge from that experience). 
 66. See id. at 16–18 (examining four different groups of downwardly 
mobile, middle-class Americans, including former managers and executives and 
divorced mothers). 
 67. See id. at 11 (“The absence of socially validated pathways for dealing 
with economic decline has important consequences for the downwardly mobile. 
They often mourn in isolation and fail to reach any sense of closure . . . . Their 
disorientation suggests how critical culture is in ‘explaining’ to individuals the 
meaning of their fate.”).  
 68. See id. at 231 (“When economic displacement strikes, it not only jars 
the victim’s own sense of position, it disrupts a family trajectory, weakening its 
sense of forward motion or upward mobility.”). 
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favor of income- or class-based approaches.69 The legal 
scholarship on bankruptcy examines debt but largely focuses on 
debating the causes of overindebtedness.70 It has not made an 
intense or sustained effort to explore the consequences of debt, or 
even to explore how the consequences of overindebtedness may 
vary depending on the causality of the debt problems.71 As John 
Pottow has recently observed, “To be sure, the case for negative 
bankruptcy externalities is more intuitive than empirical at this 
juncture.”72 Because we have only a shallow understanding of the 
harms of excessive debt (and how they may converge or diverge 
with other forms of financial hardship), it is difficult to develop a 
crisp plan for empirical investigation.73 The existing legal and 
                                                                                                     
 69. See supra notes 52–68 and accompanying text (critiquing the studies of 
several sociologists who identify class and income as sources of harm rather 
than debt). 
 70. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text (critiquing legal works 
that focus on the causes of overindebtedness). 
 71. Stephen Lubben observed to me that the effects of unmanageable debt 
may vary depending on whether the debt is incurred following an exogenous 
financial shock, such as an unanticipated job layoff, or is incurred as part of a 
pattern of compulsive overconsumption. I agree with this perspective but keep 
the focus of this Article firmly on the consequences of unmanageable debt, 
rather than its causes, to advance the theoretical framework for examining the 
impact of overindebtedness on human welfare. The causation literature on 
bankruptcy is rich, and future empirical work on the harms of debt should 
certainly engage it. I do note, however, that American bankruptcy law does not 
require debtors to have “good cause” for their debt problems to qualify for a 
bankruptcy discharge. Indeed, the bankruptcy process usually does not inquire 
at all into the reasons that consumer debts were incurred. This supports my 
assertion that much of the normative justification for bankruptcy and credit 
regulation is to reduce the harms of overindebtedness to all debtors, not to 
selectively relieve the deserving debtors of those harms.  
 72. Pottow, supra note 36, at 412. From the context of the article, which 
articulates an argument for a tort of reckless lending, I take Professor Pottow to 
mean externalities incurred in the period of debt-induced financial distress that 
typically precedes bankruptcy, rather than externalities that result from the 
bankruptcy filing itself. 
 73. Professor John Pottow has compared the legal scholarship on the 
harms of debt with the research on the harms of smoking and concluded as 
much. “The sophistication of Hanson and Logue’s analysis (and that of the 
studies they critique) demonstrates that their field is light years ahead of 
bankruptcy scholarship with respect to the depth of its empirical research into 
the scope and costs of externalities in one product market.” Id. at 412 n.33 
(referring to analysis in Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of 
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1163 (1998)). 
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sociological literature offers a starting point for identifying 
possible harms of overindebtedness.  
III. The Multidimensional Space of Poverty 
The prior Part noted the lack of empirical work on the harms 
of having unmanageable debt burdens. In so doing, it did not 
challenge measuring the problem of overindebtedness using 
dollar metrics, such as debt-to-income ratios, absolute dollars of 
debt, or negative wealth. It accepted that, at least when the debt 
burden crosses a threshold into being unmanageable, that debt is 
inversely proportional to individuals’ welfare and that the 
magnitude of overindebtedness is roughly proximate to the 
degree of harms from overindebtedness.  
In this Part, I critique the validity of using financial metrics 
as the exclusive proxy to measure the problems of unmanageable 
debt. I draw a parallel between using the singular measure of 
income to assess the harms of poverty and using the singular 
measure of debt to assess the harms of overindebtedness, and 
argue that such approaches are plagued with similar weaknesses. 
I describe the alternative multidimensional framework for 
measuring poverty harms that assesses people’s capabilities to 
achieve aspects of welfare such as health and access to markets. 
In subsequent Parts, I analyze how such a multidimensional 
measure of welfare might be applied to study the harms of debt-
induced financial distress.  
Traditional measures of poverty focus on income.74 Aggregate 
economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are 
used to compare the problem of poverty between countries. 
Another measurement technique is counting all people whose 
incomes were below a determined income threshold.75 These 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Amartya Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, in POVERTY 
AND INEQUALITY 30, 32 (David B. Grusky & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2006) (“The ‘space’ 
of incomes has been the principal—often the unique—focus of attention of those 
who have to examine the trend of inequality and poverty in the world . . . .”); 
Amartya Sen, Issues in the Measurement of Poverty, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF 
ECON. 285, 293–96 (1979). 
 75. See François Bourguignon, From Income to Endowments: The Difficult 
Task of Expanding the Income Poverty Paradigm, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, 
supra note 74, at 76 (describing the “income poverty paradigm” that dominates 
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approaches have been criticized on several grounds, 
fundamentally, as Martha Nussbaum has expressed, for being 
“obtuse in human terms.”76 I see two propositions in the critiques 
of income/wealth measures of poverty: first, that aggregate 
measures fail to recognize individual level effects;77 and second, 
that income and wealth are only instruments to human welfare, 
not ends themselves. 
David Grusky and Ravi Kanbur conclude there is a 
“consensus” among both sociologists and economists that poverty 
has negative individual-level effects on “health, political 
participation, and a host of other life conditions.”78 Concern with 
individual-level effects can derive from normative or 
consequentialist perspectives.79 Poverty may offend the public 
because it denies people fundamental human rights.80 
Alternatively, we may wish to reduce poverty to halt its negative 
externalities.81 Poverty may produce harms that extend beyond 
the individual or even the individual’s household to include 
collective effects. Within the space of income, it can be difficult to 
identify such harms. Counting the number of poor, for example, 
only indirectly incorporates the distributional harms of poverty 
because the distribution may be relevant in determining the 
income threshold for “poor.” Yet the effects of inequality (relative 
deprivation) may be different from poverty of income (absolute 
                                                                                                     
the economic research on poverty).  
 76. Martha C. Nussbaum, Poverty and Human Functioning: Capabilities as 
Fundamental Entitlements, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, supra note 74, at 47.  
 77. A parallel critique might apply to sociologists who have relied on a few 
big categories, such as social class or occupational prestige codes, to measure 
social stratification. See David B. Grusky & Kim A. Weeden, Does the 
Sociological Approach to Studying Social Mobility Have a Future?, in MOBILITY 
AND INEQUALITY: FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 85, 100–
03 (Stephen L. Morgan, David B. Grusky & Gary S. Fields eds., 2006) 
(advocating a multidimensional approach to the study of sociology and 
economics).  
 78. David B. Grusky & Ravi Kanbur, The Conceptional Foundations of 
Poverty and Inequality Measurement, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, supra note 
74, at 1.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
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deprivation) and equally troubling for those concerned with 
human welfare and economic development.82  
Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others have exposed 
the conceptual shortcoming of relying principally on income to 
measure human welfare. In numerous works, Sen has questioned 
“whether the space of incomes, despite its relevance, can really be 
the appropriate informational basis for assessing equity and 
social justice in general, and if it is inadequate, why it is so?”83 In 
his view, income is merely a means to achieving quality of life.84 
He has argued that a rich appreciation of the problem of poverty 
requires looking directly at potential and achieved welfare.85 In 
his words, “If life consists of various things that people are able to 
do or be (such as being able to live long, to be in good health, to be 
able to read and write, and so on), then it is the capability to 
function that has to be put at the center state of assessment.”86 
This “capabilities approach” permits comparisons between 
individuals along several dimensions of human functioning.87 
While there is disagreement about the key capabilities, most 
scholars identify the following elements: bodily health, adequate 
shelter, education, the right to employment, social bases of self-
respect that permit social participation, and the right to be free 
from anxiety and fear.88 In this multidimensional framework, a 
lack of income may correlate with poverty but is not poverty per 
se. Rather, the problem with poverty is the way in which it 
constrains individuals from pursuing or achieving fundamental 
                                                                                                     
 82. The failure to take inequality of distribution into account is a principal 
critique of the space of incomes for poverty studies. Amartya Sen, Poverty: An 
Ordinal Approach to Measurement, 44 ECONOMETRICA 219, 219–22 (1976); see 
also Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, supra note 74, at 36–37. The 
classic example of this problem is South Africa, which fares well under a Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita approach because of its relatively high GNP, 
despite harboring some of the sharpest inequalities between rich and poor 
(along racial lines) in the world.  
 83. Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, supra note 74, at 34.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279–85 (1998) (detailing the advantages of a capabilities 
approach). 
 88. See id. at 287–88.  
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capabilities. This different conception of human welfare 
recognizes income as an instrument of good living, not as a good 
life itself. Financial metrics may powerfully correlate with 
capability achievement, particularly in some societies. 
Conceptually, however, they are incomplete tools to assess 
people’s well-being. 
A multidimensional approach that incorporates financial 
measures as one element of welfare assessment is gaining 
acceptance in research and public policy. The United Nations has 
recognized the benefits of a multidimensional approach, 
cautioning that the pursuit of financial wealth has often obscured 
the “simple but powerful truth” that the “people are the real 
wealth of a nation.”89 Science magazine featured research on the 
negative correlation in the United States between average wages 
and reports of subjective well-being. It concluded that science is 
developed enough to support using broad measures of quality of 
life in place of income to measure the well-being of a population.90 
In September 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced 
his commitment to have France develop and use alternate 
measures to assess prosperity instead of GDP, average income, or 
poverty counts.91 While some condemned the maneuver as a 
political tactic to deflect criticism about France’s lagging 
economic growth,92 Sarkozy created a commission, which included 
five Nobel laureates, to make recommendations for measuring 
the nation’s welfare, including a component part for individual 
citizens’ welfare.93 The commission struggled to produce tractable 
metrics but suggested indicators such as educational attainment, 
opportunity for leisure, personal freedom, health, and inequality 
                                                                                                     
 89. Human Dev. Report 1990, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME ch.1 at 9, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_chap1.pdf.. 
 90. Richard Layard, Measuring Subjective Well-Being, 327 SCIENCE 534, 
534 (2010). 
 91. David Gauthier-Villars, For France, a Joie de Vivre Index, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 15, 2009, at A11.  
 92. See Brian Domitrovic, Gross Domestic Happiness?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
28, 2009, at A25 (citing possible political motivations behind the shift away from 
GDP-based assessment, which include “laggard” economic growth).  
 93. Roger Bate, Measuring the Good, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2009), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703746604574462941885608 
188. 
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indices.94 Notably, the commission did not articulate how to 
weight these components in assessing individual welfare or how 
to aggregate individual-level measures with societal-level 
measures of well-being.  
Indeed, the major challenge to a multidimensional approach 
to welfare may be practical rather than conceptual. It is difficult 
to elaborate on the relevant dimensions and perhaps even more 
difficult to design adequate measures for those dimensions.95 
Francois Bourguignon has attempted to impose some order on the 
multidimensional approach by delineating three broad categories 
of concern.96 He sees welfare as the result of the interaction 
between an individual’s endowments, an individual’s preferences, 
and a set of parameters imposed by society that condition an 
individual’s choices.97 The first element, endowments, includes 
measures of an individual’s assets at a given moment, such as 
health and education.98 The second element, preferences, refers to 
an individual’s choices and desires to achieve welfare.99 The third 
element, conditions, are limitations on the deployment of an 
individual’s endowments such as the price of goods, access to 
credit and labor markets, and public goods, such as the social 
institutions available to an individual.100 Harms to welfare occur 
in the form of unequal endowments, societal constraints to 
individual achievements, and the prevalence of maladaptive 
preferences.101  
Even within the constructs of endowments, conditions, and 
preferences, challenges abound for theorists and empiricists 
alike. A multidimensional approach to welfare arguably gives 
weight (although almost certainly not equal weight) to each of 
these elements, and so each element must be assessed in some 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id.; see also Gauthier-Villars, supra note 91 (discussing the Sarkozy 
commission).  
 95. See Bourguignon, supra note 75, at 89–93 (discussing various 
approaches of measuring poverty). 
 96. Id. at 83–85. 
 97. See id. at 80–93 (describing different approaches to comparing 
individuals in multidimensional model).  
 98. Id. at 83–84. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 78. 
1002 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979 (2012) 
replicable and ostensibly quantifiable way. Some dimensions, 
such as level of education, are susceptible to concrete measure 
with well-worn metrics. In general, many endowments have 
existing measures, whereas conditions and parameters are much 
harder to observe. An illustrative example is the constraints on 
access to labor markets. One perhaps cannot accurately rely on 
the number of people who got jobs to measure how many people 
did not get jobs. Indeed, the only way to estimate rationing in at 
least some markets may well be survey research, which is 
expensive and raises its own set of measurement concerns.  
Preferences pose particular challenges for a capabilities 
approach over a multidimensional space of bare outcomes. 
Accepting the validity of individuals’ preferences transforms the 
goal from the production of a certain level of well-being to 
equalization of endowments and constraints. For example, if we 
respect an individual’s greater preference for leisure, then we 
should not condemn that person’s failure to achieve a particular 
outcome (such as working full time to earn a high income) as an 
actual failure. In this view, the goal is to ensure that all people 
are capable of achievement—not to produce identical outcomes. 
On the other hand, many sociologists accept the idea of 
maladaptive preferences; they reject a conception of preferences 
as fixed and unaffected by changes in personal circumstances.102 
To the extent that people’s preferences are malleable and may be 
altered by societal conditions and constraints, measuring 
preferences is another dimension to see reductions in well-being. 
Lack of income or overindebtedness may change people’s 
preferences for risk, lengthen or shorten people’s time horizons, 
or force people to develop different self-control habits. 
While scholars still wrestle with how to apply a 
multidimensional framework to empirical research, the approach 
has expanded poverty and inequality research.103 The idea of a 
multidimensional space for poverty has continued to erode the 
primacy of income as a sufficient measure of well-being and 
inspired debate about whether the move from income to social 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Grusky & Kanbur, supra note 78, at 9–10 (arguing that the 
assumption of fixed preferences is “no longer tenable”).  
 103. See id. at 2 (arguing that “conceptual ground clearing” is necessary to 
make progress with poverty).  
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class merely replicates the disadvantages of a unitary measure. It 
has pushed utilitarian theorists to examine whether the 
assumption of a rational actor model is wholly accurate for 
understanding the effects of poverty and how preferences may be 
altered by financial hardship. The thrust of these arguments is 
that either class or income can be excessively abstract and 
insensitive to human welfare.104 As Martha Nussbaum has 
written, the capabilities approach supplies “a moral and humanly 
rich set of goals for development “in place of ‘the wealth and 
poverty of the economists,’ as Marx so nicely put it.”105 
IV. An Expanded Framework for Understanding the Harms of 
Overindebtedness 
I now turn to the task of developing a multidimensional 
space for excessive debt, building on the poverty framework 
described above. In so doing, I consider places where the 
multidimensional approach articulated for studying poverty and 
inequality may be an imperfect fit for assessing the connection 
between overindebtedness and welfare. My primary goal is to 
articulate dimensions for empirical investigation and to identify 
some of the obstacles to such work.  
At the outset, I acknowledge that amount of debt, especially 
as measured against available assets and income, is surely one 
appropriate basis for assessing the harms experienced by 
bankrupt families. Indeed, in many ways, it must be so. 
Unmanageable debt is the unique feature of the type of financial 
distress that characterizes bankrupt households, and the 
elimination of debt can free up income and return families to 
positive wealth. And, as Sen has conceded in the context of 
thinking about income deprivation as a measure of poverty, 
wealth is clearly a powerful general tool for ensuring a 
household’s well-being and preventing deprivation.106 Debt and 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Sabina Alkire, Choosing Dimensions: the Capability Approach and 
Multidimensional Poverty 2 (Oxford Poverty & Human Dev. Initiative, Working 
Paper No. 88), available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/ 
publication_files/WP88_Alkire.pdf (“[I]ncome data alone are perhaps the crudest 
form of measurement.”). 
 105. Nussbaum, supra note 76, at 52.  
 106. Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, supra note 74, at 33.  
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income are both useful proxies of a household’s welfare. And, 
because these financial characteristics are relatively easy to 
measure and incorporate into models, they should remain useful 
tools for assessing quality of life.  
This Article does not seek to displace financial metrics but, 
instead, suggests their limitations by considering the actual 
effects of debt-induced financial distress—how overindebted 
individuals live, work, parent, plan, learn, participate in society, 
etc. To understand the myriad ways that overindebtedness may 
result in reduced welfare, we need more than a diagnostic tool 
that a problem exists. We need instruments to measure the 
symptoms of the problem. It is in this way that the capabilities 
approach used in poverty research may expand our 
understanding of overindebtedness.  
The problem of excessive debt is not that it reduces wealth 
per se but that it harms people’s capacity for well-being. To 
construct a multidimensional space for studying the problem of 
overindebtedness, I build off the three components in François 
Bourguignon’s model for welfare: an individual’s endowments or 
assets, an individual’s ability to use those endowments through 
social or economic conditions, and an individual’s preferences to 
use his or her endowments.107 The relevant dimensions are 
sometimes at the individual level, such as endowments or 
preferences, and sometimes at the societal level, such as 
parameters that inhibit individuals’ capacities to achieve well-
being. Drawing on the small body of prior research, I identify 
specific endowments, conditions, and preferences that seem like 
promising areas for investigating the harms of overindebtedness.  
Endowments are qualities of an individual that are available 
to improve one’s welfare.108 The classic example, of course, is 
wealth.109 The capabilities frame recognizes wealth as only one 
                                                                                                     
 107. Bourguignon, supra note 75, at 83–84. Bourguignon excludes 
preferences from his later model, saying that because these determinants are in 
the control of an individual, they should not be ingredients in measuring 
poverty. See id. at 101. I disagree. I take at least some subset of preferences to 
be malleable and responsive to the experience of poverty or debt, and thus I 
believe that measurement of preferences is an important component to 
assessing how poverty or debt shapes welfare.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
THE DAMAGE OF DEBT 1005 
measure of welfare.110 It takes wealth largely to be a means of 
good living, and conversely, negative wealth, which occurs 
because of debt, as a reduction in the means of good living.111 
Wealth is a better endowment measure than consumption, 
particularly in the United States where consumption is often 
financed by debt. Because consumption will rise in tandem with 
debt but may have opposite effects of well-being, it is an 
unreliable marker of well-being for indebted individuals.112 
Wealth nets out such effects, taking into account the debt 
burdens that accompany consumption or asset accumulation.  
Debt can cause people to diminish their wealth, either 
voluntarily, by selling assets to pay debts, or involuntarily, when 
creditors resort to coercive processes for debt collection. Although 
this relationship is straightforward, the empirical research on the 
connection between asset-building and borrowing is incomplete. 
Research suggests that debtors in the United States are 
relatively infrequently subjected to coercive processes and, 
perhaps, that such processes have not grown in proportion to the 
rising debt loads of households.113 Longitudinal research on 
households in debt could monitor how asset levels vary with debt 
burdens, but no appropriate data set currently exists.114 We know 
                                                                                                     
 110. Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, supra note 74, at 34. 
 111. Id. 
 112.  A similar problem with consumption arises with smoking. In a 
consumption model, spending on cigarettes counts as an increase in well-being, 
although it is clearly counter to good health. See Grusky & Kanbar, supra note 
78, at 9 (discussing two World Bank reports, one documenting the social costs of 
smoking in developing countries and the other counting increased spending on 
cigarettes as a decrease in poverty). 
 113. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT 
IN AMERICA 331–33 (1989) [hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS] 
(“Creditors have not organized their information systems to detect and halt 
credit abuse.”); Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households 
with Nothing to Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 493, 498 (2006) (noting 
that “many creditors may abandon collection efforts without seeking a 
judgment”).  
 114. The Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finance and the 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a collaboration of academic researchers 
(including the Author), collect data from about 2,000 households. The difficulty 
is that the Survey of Consumer Finance, designed to be representative of the 
U.S. population, has in absolute numbers only a relatively small number of 
individuals who have unmanageable debt, for example as measured along 
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very little about how debt burdens alter asset accumulation or, 
alternatively, affect individuals’ earnings trajectories.115 Even for 
assets, the dimension that most closely relates to debt, the 
consequences of excessive debt are not extensively documented.  
Other important endowments that may be altered as a result 
of overindebtedness are education, job training, and health. In 
the context of studying intragenerational mobility of adults, I 
would add family resources as an important endowment. An 
individual with extended family resources or a spouse/partner 
may ask those people to make financial contributions or enter the 
labor market to cope with overindebtedness. In examining the 
harms of debt-induced financial distress, these endowments may 
vary over the life course. While a middle-aged adult may have a 
fixed endowment of education (given the small likelihood of 
returning to school), the health status of an adult may fluctuate 
in the future. For younger adults, education and job training may 
be immediately subject to the effects of debt, such as when an 
individual drops out of college or is denied a promotion at work 
because of his poor credit.  
The most extensive research on the relationship of 
overindebtedness to an endowment explores whether there is a 
negative relationship between health and debt problems. While 
                                                                                                     
criteria such as credit denials, late payments, or bankruptcy filings. The 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project is by design only a sample of people in 
bankruptcy and is not representative of all households, such as those with 
relatively modest debt burdens. Neither survey is longitudinal, although the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project has had a modest panel component in the past. 
See Brian K. Bucks, Out of Balance?: Financial Distress in U.S. Households, in 
BROKE, supra note 45, at 41–42 (discussing measurement and comparison 
problems between the Survey of Consumer Finance and the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project). The Federal Reserve Board conducted a supplemental 
panel study in late 2009 with its respondent households from the 2007 Survey. 
See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Will Soon Begin a 
Statistical Study of Household Finances to Update Data Collected at the Outset 
of the Economic Downturn that Began in Late 2007 (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20090727a.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. There is some recent work in this regard using bankrupt households. 
See Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge 
Finances: Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 283–
84 (2008) (analyzing postdischarge finances of debtors); Katherine Porter & 
Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
67, 94–97 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of income to a successful financial 
situation postbankruptcy).  
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not nearly as sizeable as the empirical work establishing that 
poverty has health-damaging consequences,116 the research 
suggests several pathways of association between unmanageable 
debt and health harms.117 Excessive debt may be associated with 
underutilization of medical treatment.118 In the extended period 
of financial distress before bankruptcy, one’s health may be 
worsened, say by the amputation of a limb from inadequate 
treatment of diabetes. This is a permanent change to an 
individual’s health endowment that clearly harms her welfare in 
human terms, as well as economic terms of inhibiting labor 
opportunity. Unmanageable debt may condition one’s access to 
health care or may itself worsen health by creating or 
aggravating mental or physical conditions. For example, a study 
of Germans found an increased probability of obesity among 
overindebted individuals, even when controlling for other 
socioeconomic factors. The researchers concluded this 
relationship may reflect ways in which debt limits leisure 
activities and participation in social life, as well as constrains the 
purchase of healthy food.119 Other research has suggested 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Peggy McDonough et al., Time on My Side? Life Course Trajectories 
of Poverty and Health, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1795, 1797 (2005) (collecting prior 
research on poverty and health dynamics). McDonough et al. conclude that 
while permanently nonpoor respondents generally always had better health, 
exiting poverty did not always improve health because the poverty experience 
created a residual poverty-health gap. Id. at 1806.  
 117. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 560 (2002) (“In a recent study, 
nearly half of the sample of individual bankruptcy filers reported they also were 
dealing with illness, injury, or substantial medical debt.”).  
 118. Note that the path to this underutilization may be somewhat different 
than for those who simply cannot pay for health care at all due to a lack of 
income. Excessive debt may result in collection pressure, guilt, or fear of 
property loss that could lead an individual to forgo health care in favor of using 
income to meet other obligations. That is, as paying off debt becomes more of a 
necessity in an individual’s mind, an individual could come to view health care 
as less of a necessity. The result of these changes in priority prompt the 
individual to make different spending decisions. In the model, this is an altered 
preference for how to use the endowment of income. Yet the damage from the 
debt pressure to human welfare is a reduced endowment of health on a going 
forward basis.  
 119. See Link Between Over-indebtedness and Obesity Identified, MED. NEWS 
TODAY, (Aug. 12, 2009), available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
releases/160430.php.  
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correlations between mental illness and overindebtedness.120 
While reducing debt via a bankruptcy discharge can free up 
income from debt service that can be used to pay for health care, 
the pathway between debt and health may be much more 
complex. The discharge of debt may be an instantaneous remedy 
for balance sheets but not for human health. The stress and 
emotional harms of struggling with debt, for example, may be 
replaced after bankruptcy by shame and guilt at having sought 
bankruptcy relief.  
Conditions are socially imposed limits on an individual’s use 
of her endowments and preferences.121 They are not individual 
qualities, although each individual will be subject to a particular 
set of conditions. In the American economy, access to markets is a 
crucial set of conditions. In the last thirty years, the development 
of credit scores has dramatically lowered the cost of decisions 
about imposing conditions. A wide range of jobs, including those 
at the middle to lower end of the occupational spectrum, requires 
applicants to pass a credit check.122 This constraint is a serious, 
and largely unexamined, consequence of debt.123 Many 
households will cope with a job loss by borrowing. If the period of 
unemployment is sustained and the debt accumulates to the point 
                                                                                                     
 120. See, e.g., H. Ruger et al., Mental Illness and Over-indebtedness: Mental 
Illness, Social Networks, and Financial Strain in Over-indebted Persons, 60 
PSYCHOTHERAPY, PSYCHOSOMATICS & MED. PSYCH. 250 (2009) (discussing the 
potential link between debt and mental illness).  
 121. See Bourguignon, supra note 75, at 84 (describing conditions as “a set of 
parameters . . . conditioning the individual’s choices and imposed upon him/her 
by society”). 
 122. In 2004, about 43% of U.S. employers checked the credit reports of job 
applicants; that number has trended sharply upward in the last decade. See 
Thomas Frank, Job Credit Checks Called Unfair, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009, at 
1A (noting a 36% increase between 2004 and 2009 in the percentage of 
employers that check credit scores). Credit checks are used in many industries 
outside of financial services, including education and data entry. See Jonathan 
D. Glater, Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2009, at A1 (discussing an individual who was denied a data-entry job); 
Christina Rexrode, Job Hunting? Check Your Credit, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Aug. 30, 2009 (reporting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district backed 
down on plans to run credit checks after teacher protest).  
 123. The only study of this kind uses 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
data. See Thorne, supra note 50, at 35–37 (reporting that among people who 
tried to find new employment after bankruptcy, 45% of respondents claimed 
that their bankruptcy was a reason for the denial of employment).  
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that it becomes unmanageable, then the individual will face 
barriers to reemployment because of a low credit score. Debt, and 
default on debt, may thus directly bear on labor market 
processes. Conceptualizing the problem as debt itself does not 
highlight this attenuated harm. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, 
that bankruptcy law does nothing to address this problem.124  
Conditions on future borrowing are an important concern in 
the context of understanding the experience of excessive debt. 
Here, as I have noted in prior research, there is little consensus 
about what amount of borrowing opportunity is optimal for 
individuals who have or have had excessive debt.125 Consumer 
advocates lament continued lending to those already mired in 
debt.126 After bankruptcy, however, return to the credit economy 
may be a crucial element to maximizing a debtor’s productivity. 
                                                                                                     
 124. Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits private employers from 
terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment 
against, a bankruptcy debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2006). A vast majority of 
bankruptcy courts interpret this provision to apply only to existing employment 
relationships. It appears legal for an employer to refuse to hire a person because 
the person has filed bankruptcy. See Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401, 405–06 
(E.D. Va. 1996) (“Congress’ inclusion of an explicit reference to hiring in 
§ 525(a), juxtaposed with its deliberate omission in § 525(b) six years later, 
makes unmistakably clear that subsection (b) does not reach hiring decisions.”); 
Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186 B.R. 553, 554 (D. Mass. 1995) (“The fact that 
there is specific  mention of discrimination in the termination of employment, 
but no corresponding mention of the inception of employment suggests an 
intentional omission.”); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc., No. 06-34312-H4-13, 2008 
WL 4609983, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2008) (“A close reading and 
comparison of the language in subsections (a) and (b) leads to the [conclusion 
that] the private sector is prohibited only from discriminating against those 
persons who are already employees.”). But see Leary v. Waranco, Inc., 251 B.R. 
656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (interpreting the language in § 525(b) to include 
hiring). And regardless of the scope of Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, an 
employer could refuse to hire a debtor on the basis of poor credit, rather than 
bankruptcy itself, and apparently circumvent the statute entirely. 
 125. See Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business 
Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1416 (2008) 
(discussing the differences between secured and unsecured credit opportunities 
for postbankruptcy debtors). 
 126. See Brad Stone, Drawing a Bead on Debtors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, 
at 1 (describing lenders’ practice of culling credit agency information to market 
to particular demographics, including those who have fallen deeply into debt). 
Jim Campen, the Executive Director of the Americans for Fairness in Lending, 
stated that “[lenders] get people who they know are in trouble, they know are 
desperate, and they aggressively market a product to them which is not in their 
best interest.” Id. 
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For example, an individual’s capabilities suffer if prior debt 
problems inhibit credit extensions for sound ideas for new 
businesses. Similarly, a person who cannot borrow to purchase a 
new vehicle after repossession may be unable to work or attend 
school without access to transportation. Two very recent studies 
have largely confirmed the findings of my research on the 
widespread availability of postbankruptcy credit and debtors’ 
reluctance to use such credit.127 A multidimensional space for 
understanding excessive debt sharpens the theoretical 
implications of this work, situating it alongside other market 
constraints or rationing activity.  
Another important market that is conditioned on debt is the 
housing market, both for homeownership (perhaps better 
examined under credit access) and for rental housing.128 This is a 
question of great importance for the well-being of families in the 
United States because, as Douglas Massey has noted, “[H]ousing 
markets distribute education, insurance rates, wealth, safety, 
peer groups, and employment.”129 The multidimensional approach 
helps us recognize that foreclosure from unmanageable mortgage 
debt imposes harms beyond a loss of wealth. A recent work by 
Marianne Culhane examines what happens to bankrupt families 
who lose their homes due to financial pressures. She documents 
their next place of residence after foreclosure and their attitudes 
about homeownership.130 Understanding how failed homeownership 
will affect future housing outcomes is an urgent policy issue for 
responding to the ongoing foreclosure crisis.131 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Song Han & Geng Li, Household Borrowing After Personal 
Bankruptcy, 43 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 491, 507 (2011) (comparing the 
likelihood of obtaining credit for bankruptcy filers and nonfilers); Ethan Cohen-
Cole, Burcu Duygan-Bump & Judit Montoriol-Garriga, Forgive and Forget: Who 
Gets Credit After Bankruptcy and Why?, 9, 18–22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., 
Working Paper No. QAU09-2, 2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/bank 
info/qau/wp/2009/qau0902.pdf (discussing postbankrupcy access to credit). 
 128. See Thorne, supra note 50, at 33–34, tbl.1 (reporting findings on credit 
score discrimination in rental housing from survey of bankruptcy debtors). 
 129. Douglas S. Massey, Race, Class, and Markets: Social Policy in the 21st 
Century, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, supra note 74, at 117, 129. 
 130. See generally Marianne B. Culhane, No Forwarding Address: Losing 
Homes in Bankruptcy, in BROKE, supra note 45, at 129–34.  
 131. I have been unable to locate research on how foreclosure affects the 
odds and success of future homeownership. One study of duration of 
homeownership status was conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban 
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Social exclusion may also be a consequence of 
overindebtedness. This can be characterized as a condition on an 
individual’s choices. The bankruptcy literature has engaged this 
concept in terms of debates about whether the stigma of 
bankruptcy has increased or decreased.132 But a focus on stigma 
as a check to the moral hazard of bankruptcy is distinct from 
understanding stigma as a consequence of debt. If participation 
in social institutions is conditioned on unmanageable debt, this is 
a real harm that limits human welfare. The poverty literature 
has explored the connection between income and social 
participation, noting that each society defines a set of 
commodities needed to take part in the life of the community.133 A 
lack of goods may prohibit meaningful social interaction.  
Social-exclusion dynamics may operate in another way: by 
stigmatizing those who seek or receive assistance. In this regard, 
François Bourguignon has noted that “[t]o some extent, income 
transfers may even worsen the situation as they may stigmatize 
their beneficiaries.”134 Seeking bankruptcy relief to address 
unmanageable debt could function similarly. Although it relieves 
debt, if a debtor suffers exclusions from markets and social life as 
a result, the harms of overindebtedness continue even after the 
discharge of the debt itself.  
Debt burdens may inhibit social participation by lowering 
one’s self-esteem or may inhibit the consumption that is often a 
                                                                                                     
Development using panel data ending in 2000, which predates the current 
crisis. See DONALD R. HAURIN & STUART S. ROSENTHAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., THE SUSTAINABILITY OF HOMEOWNERSHIP: FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
DURATION OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND RENTAL SPELLS 37–48 (2004) (documenting 
the factors that affect the duration of homeownership). The models developed in 
that study do not measure the association between debt burdens and 
homeownership duration or examine the future housing patterns of people who 
lost homes to foreclosure. Id.  
 132. Compare Less Stigma, supra note 26, at 233–46 (questioning the theory 
that declining stigma associated with bankruptcy, if it exists at all, is 
responsible for increased filings), with Jones & Zywicki, supra note 28, at 215–
21 (citing studies supporting the proposition that bankruptcy’s stigma has 
declined in recent decades).  
 133. See, e.g., Sen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, supra note 74, 
at 37 (discussing the set of commodities required for a New Yorker to take part 
in the community). 
 134. Bourguignon, supra note 75, at 77.  
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required component of taking part in everyday social activities.135 
Allison Pugh has coined the term “economy of dignity” to capture 
the way in which goods and experiences shape self-esteem and a 
sense of belonging to social life.136 This economy of dignity can be 
seen not only as a process for self-evaluation but also as a market 
for commodifying others. A provocative example in this regard is 
the recent arrival of agencies that do credit checks on prospective 
spouses. Public advertisements for such services transmit the 
message that social exclusion from marriage is an appropriate 
reaction to debt problems.137 Other social constraints from debt 
could be more even direct. For example, European countries may 
prohibit bankrupt individuals from holding elected political office 
or serving as directors of public companies.138 Although the 
United States has few such laws, social stigmatization may 
operate to impose such barriers, even when formal law does not. 
The conditions imposed on overindebted people may also change 
over time; as debt problems become more common, society may 
develop a greater tolerance of those with debt problems.139 Of 
                                                                                                     
 135. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Respondent W3_0637D, 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Question CHLD07 (“It caused anger because 
they were unable to do athletics and school activities like their friends.”). Nearly 
three-fourths (73%) of parents said their children did without clothes or shoes 
that they needed because they could not afford them. See 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, Telephone Interview Question PRV02. The question 
allowed parents to define “need,” which they almost certainly constructed in 
absolute, as well as relative terms, based on norms of social acceptance. 
 136. ALLISON J. PUGH, LONGING AND BELONGING: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND 
CONSUMER CULTURE 6–8 (2009).  
 137. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Wife Beaters and Bankrupts, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Apr. 29, 2007, 2:35 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/04/ 
wife_beaters_an_1.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (“A quarter page 
advertisement in the New York Times shows a young man and woman 
laughing . . . under the headline ‘Get the whole story on him, before it’s too late.’ 
The advertiser, Intelius, promises to check out two things: 1) Bankruptcy, and 2) 
Domestic Violence Convictions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 138. See, e.g., Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 426A (Eng.) (stating that a 
person with a bankruptcy restrictions order or debt relief restrictions order shall 
be disqualified from Parliament); European Commission, Best Project on 
Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Final Report of the Expert Group, 
19–20 (2003), available at http://www.eversjung.de/ceemes/webfile/show/581 
(describing the restrictions and prohibitions of bankrupt individuals in countries 
of the European Union). 
 139. See Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of 
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course, the converse is also possible. As default rates escalate, 
sanctions against those with debt problems may increase as a 
means of deterring borrowing to the point of excess.  
Preferences are the final element of a multidimensional 
framework for assessing the influence of debt on well-being.140 
The capabilities approach explicitly acknowledges that 
individuals will make choices that affect their welfare, focusing 
on capability rather than outcome as its central goal.141 
Preferences reflect individuals’ different desires. In the economic 
framework that dominates the consumer credit and bankruptcy 
literature, the standard assumption is that such preferences are 
rational and fixed. Behavioral work has exposed how cognitive 
biases may undermine rational decision making.142 In the poverty 
literature, the idea of an underclass, while contested, has 
facilitated recognition of the malleability of preferences and how 
some adaptive preferences may harm individuals’ well-being.143 
                                                                                                     
Structure and Culture, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 336–42 (2006) 
(providing a historical examination of consumer tolerance to debt and 
indebtedness in Europe and the United States). 
 140. See Bourguignon, supra note 75, at 84 (listing preferences as the third 
and final element of his multidimensional approach). 
 141. See id. at 85 (“Outcome determinants beyond the control of individuals, 
rather than outcomes per se should be the basis for defining poverty or for 
measuring inequality.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 142. See, e.g., Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, 
Uncertainty, and Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, 
and Default 16 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper 
Number 08-33, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1319751 (finding that a “quasi hyperbolic” discounting model may 
better explain consumer payday borrowing, repayment, and default); see also 
Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 
48–50 (2006) (using an example of how consumers underestimate future credit 
card borrowing to illustrate how card companies’ “bundling” of transacting and 
financing services can harm consumers who build up debt); Michael S. Barr & 
Jane Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation Among Low- 
and Moderate-Income Taxpayers (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law & Econ., Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 79, 2007), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=umichlwps 
(concluding that low to moderate-income tax filers may have a preference for 
overwithholding because they “seek a pre-commitment device against the 
tendency to over-consume”). 
 143. See William Julius Wilson, Social Theory and the Concept “Underclass”, 
in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, supra note 74, at 103 (discussing poverty scholars’ 
reaction to the idea of an “underclass” and examining the implications of such 
reactions). 
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These adaptive preferences are shaped over time in response to 
life experiences and then color individuals’ assessments of their 
well-being.  
Preferences may also change during one’s lifetime based on 
the experience of indebtedness.144 Most obviously, people may be 
fearful of credit and seek to avoid it, even when a rational choice 
framework would show a benefit to borrowing. My research on 
the financial habits of families in the aftermath of bankruptcy 
suggests distaste for credit and for credit cards in particular.145 
Years of anxiety about the possibility of garnishment or levy may 
also lead bankrupt families to eschew traditional banking or to 
hide assets. Alternatively, some families may choose a strict cash 
economy for their household as a budgeting device to prevent 
entanglement with debt through mechanisms such as overdraft 
fees or lines of credit. Michael Barr and others have illustrated 
the costs of being “unbanked.”146 These preferences to avoid 
mainstream financial institutions impose direct financial costs on 
individuals, who pay higher fees to use fringe banking services 
and generate externalities, such as difficulty in ensuring taxation 
of all income.  
The experience of financial distress caused by debt may also 
change people’s appetite for risk. The hardships of debt may 
change people’s risk preferences, leading to myopic 
                                                                                                     
 144. This is another justification for the capabilities approach rather than a 
strict utilitarian lens. If maladaptation can occur, people’s own assessments of 
their well-being reflect the status quo, rather than their genuine desires. 
Martha Nussbaum explains that because “deprived people frequently exhibit 
‘adaptive preferences,’ preferences that have adjusted to their second-class 
status . . . the utilitarian framework, which asks people what they currently 
prefer and how satisfied they are, proves inadequate to confront some pressing 
issues of justice.” Nussbaum, supra note 76, at 48.  
 145. See Katherine Porter, Life After Debt: Understanding the Credit 
Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (finding 
that only one in four Chapter 7 debtors report any new credit one year after 
bankruptcy). The constraint in borrowing is not a result of strict credit 
rationing. Households who discharge debts in bankruptcy get offers for both 
secured and unsecured credit within the first months after bankruptcy. See 
Porter, supra note 125, at 1373 (“[C]reditors repeatedly solicit debtors to borrow 
after bankruptcy.”). 
 146. See Michael S. Barr, An Inclusive, Progressive National Savings and 
Financial Services Policy, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 162–64 (2007) 
(describing “unbanked” families and detailing their difficulties, which include 
resorting to high cost check-cashing services). 
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miscalculations. As a hypothesis, people who have suffered from 
debt may then save excessively in the future to avoid another 
bout of distress. If this savings leads to underinvestment in 
themselves or their children, then this preference will produce 
social loss. In 1968, David Caplovitz hypothesized a similar effect 
of debt on occupational preferences. He posited that debt-
burdened individuals might avoid entrepreneurial employment, 
preferring the stability of less lucrative, wage-earning 
positions.147  
A panel study of Dutch households provides a useful model of 
how one could study the association between debt and 
preferences.148 Paul Webley and Ellen Nyhus incorporated 
measures for attitudes to debt, time preferences, and self-control 
into a telephone survey of debt burdens.149 Their focus is 
primarily on predicting debt, but they also consider the inverse 
effect—that short time horizons and a lack of self-control are a 
consequence of debt, and that accepting attitudes toward debt 
may be an adaptive preference of having been in debt.150 In their 
words, “getting into debt makes debt seem not quite so bad.”151 
Relying on cross-time correlation measures, they report that the 
association between debt burdens in Time Period 1 and 
psychological variables in Time Period 2 is stronger than the 
converse association of psychological variables in Time Period 1 
and debt burdens in Time Period 2.152 This suggests that 
indebtedness changes preferences, such as time horizons for 
satisfaction and self-control.153 Replication of this approach with 
panel data on bankrupt households would help identify whether 
excessive debt alters preferences of American consumers.  
                                                                                                     
 147. See David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 641, 643 (1968), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
1191015?seq=3 (noting the “emergence of the new middle class of salaried 
employees and the decline of the old middle class of entrepreneurs”). 
 148. See Paul Webley & Ellen K. Nyhus, Life-cycle and Dispositional Routes 
into Problem Debt, 92 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 423, 423 (2001) (studying “the correlates 
of debt in a three-wave panel study of saving and other financial behaviour”).  
 149. See id. at 428 (discussing the methodology of their survey). 
 150. See id. at 442 (discussing the “psychological variables” that are 
associated with debt).  
 151. Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 152. Id. at 439–40 & tbl.6. 
 153. Id. 
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In identifying those appropriate dimensions, one conceptual 
difficulty lies in the possible temporal differences in poverty and 
indebtedness. Social scientists have documented, as a general 
matter, the intractability of poverty in an individual’s lifetime,154 
but have focused most of their energies on intergenerational 
mobility, rather than intragenerational mobility.155 The paucity of 
research leads to a certain amount of conjecture on the 
trajectories of indebtedness, most of it building off a theory of 
debt as a consumption-smoothing model over the life cycle. 
Although we know very little about the duration of excessive debt 
as a phenomenon,156 scholars in the last thirty years have firmly 
pinned down the demographic characteristics of bankrupt 
households.157 One of the most enduring findings of this research 
is that bankrupt households have multiple indicia of middle-class 
status, excepting income.  
Families have very low incomes when they file for 
bankruptcy. The median debtor has an income just above the 
poverty line; even the top income quintile of bankrupt households 
earns less than the median income of the general U.S. 
                                                                                                     
 154. Conclusions about the duration of poverty vary, in part, because of 
different approaches to measuring time in poverty. For a discussion of the prior 
literature and estimates from a complex model that accounts for repeated 
episodes of poverty, see Ann Huff Stevens, Climbing Out of Poverty, Falling 
Back In: Measuring the Persistence of Poverty over Multiple Spells, 34 J. HUMAN 
RESOURCES 557, 558–62 (1999). Stevens concludes that time in poverty varies 
substantially with demographic characteristics but that, on average, a family in 
poverty will spend over four of the next ten years in poverty. Id. at 583.  
 155. See generally M. Corcoran, Rags to Rags: Poverty and Mobility in the 
United States, 21 ANN. REV. SOC 237 (1995) (evaluating recent models 
explaining intergenerational poverty).  
 156. See Webley & Nyhus, supra note 148, at 424–25 (noting the paucity of 
empirical evidence and developing a taxonomy of debtors’ “careers”).  
 157. See AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 113, at 49–62 (providing 
stories of bankrupt families); FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 25, at 41 
fig.2.1, 46 fig.2.2, 53 fig.2.3 (graphing age, racial–ethnic composition, and 
education (respectively) of bankrupt debtors); Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah 
Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In Between: Who Files for 
Bankruptcy?, 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2001, at 1 (presenting a 
longitudinal study containing demographic data on debtors in 1991 and 2001); 
Elizabeth Warren, supra note 6, at 24–30 (discussing women in bankruptcy and 
noting their increasing propensity to file); Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse 
and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 129–42 
(2003) (measuring bankruptcy by categories such as education and occupation). 
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population.158 The disparity between income and other class 
indicia suggests that bankrupt households have experienced 
substantial income loss in the period preceding their 
bankruptcy.159 This suggests that overindebtedness, at least for 
families who seek bankruptcy relief, may be a transitional 
experience of downward mobility, rather than a persistent state.  
On the other hand, I have reported that more than two-
thirds of bankrupt households say that they seriously struggled 
for more than one year before filing bankruptcy.160 The modal 
response, selected by more than 40% of bankruptcy debtors, was 
a serious struggle of more than two years before bankruptcy.161 In 
other research, I have shown that bankruptcy does not ensure 
people avoid further financial problems. In a study of Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, Deborah Thorne and I show that the fresh start of a 
bankruptcy discharge does not usually translate to a higher 
future income.162 In a study of Chapter 13 bankruptcy, I report 
that less than half of those filing cases achieve either a discharge 
of debt or a significant nondischarge goal, such as saving a 
home.163 This research leads me to suggest that we should think 
about excessive debt as being a sustained, if not chronic, 
experience. In this regard, excessive debt is perhaps more similar 
to poverty. Because the temporal nature of overindebtedness, 
even among the limited population of those whose debts drive 
them to bankruptcy, is unclear, any initial study might begin 
with the hypothesis that unmanageable debt has relatively 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Deborah Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, A Vulnerable Middle Class: 
Bankruptcy and Class Status, in BROKE, supra note 45, at 25 (reporting 
consistent findings in 1991, 2001, and 2007 surveys of bankrupt households’ 
occupational prestige, homeownership, and educational attainment).  
 159. See id. (discussing Consumer Bankruptcy Project data, which show that 
“shortly before filing, many people lost their jobs or saw their work hours 
reduced”). 
 160. Mann & Porter, supra note 7, at 313–14. 
 161. Id. This was the first time such a question had been posed to bankrupt 
households, and the responses suggest that the question design may have 
censored the top range of respondents’ true experiences. We simply cannot 
discern how much beyond two years the 40% of respondents may have 
struggled.  
 162. See Porter & Thorne, supra note 115, at 94 fig.6 (depicting changes in 
income correlated to families’ self-reported financial situation).  
163.  See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of 
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 153 (2011). 
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enduring effects. This uncertainty about the duration of 
overindebtedness, and the degree to which it may vary among 
households whose debt problems have different primary causes, 
leads me to err toward inclusion in suggesting dimensions worthy 
of empirical investigation.  
V. Dimensions for Future Empirical Research  
A multidimensional framework is unwieldy in practical 
application, and perhaps can never achieve the precision of 
unitary financial metrics for welfare such as income or debt. 
Applying the theoretical frame to concrete data, however, helps to 
expose its strengths and weaknesses, both as a theory and for 
practical application. I conclude this Article by exploring 
directions for future empirical studies on the consequences of 
overindebtedness.  
In the prior Part, I identified some specific dimensions in 
which unmanageable debt may create harms to welfare. 
Empirical research within the multidimensional frame could 
begin by gathering data on the association between a single 
dimension and debt. Such measures of the interaction between 
increasing debt burdens and single capabilities can then be used 
as building blocks in a multidimensional assessment of the 
welfare harms of overindebtedness. For example, a labor 
economist could add measures of debt burdens to a panel study of 
occupational choices and wages. This would allow an estimation 
of the interaction between indebtedness, occupational rigidity, 
and labor market barriers. Such research tests a single 
dimension of the model, rather than the usefulness of a 
multidimensional approach itself. Nonetheless, it would help 
tease out whether income, poverty, and debt-induced financial 
distress have distinct consequences. This piece-wise approach 
also permits comparison of different scales or constructs for 
capturing the harms of overindebtedness, helping to determine 
whether existing models, such as mobility on socioeconomic 
prestige scales, capture the harms of overindebtedness or 
whether they are manifest in other ways, such as wage 
stagnation.  
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To take another example, the key effect of debt problems on 
health could either be physical or mental, perhaps with the latter 
effects then feeding back into physical outcomes. Separate 
projects on debt and health could test whether well-worn 
measures, such as the five-point self-assessment of overall health, 
are useful to capture the effects of debt.164 If not, then researchers 
can debate whether such effects are of minimal magnitude or 
require alternative measures. For example, if its sample size 
were expanded to include a sufficient sample of heavily indebted 
households, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) could 
add a set of health measures permitting analysis of whether the 
relationship between debt and psychological health that has been 
identified in British households is also present in American 
households.165  
The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project is the most 
comprehensive data set on heavily debt-burdened households.166 
Its sample consists of over 2,000 households that filed consumer 
bankruptcy in the first quarter of 2007.167 The project asked 
debtors to complete written surveys at the time of bankruptcy, 
coded financial data drawn from each debtor’s court records, and 
conducted in-depth telephone interviews of more than one hour 
with over 1,000 debtors. The data include several measures of the 
consequences of struggling with debt and bankruptcy. These 
measures can be organized into the three elements of the 
                                                                                                     
 164. The National Health Interview Survey uses such a measure, which has 
been found to be a powerful predictor of mortality and to correlate with other 
measures such as hospitalization episodes. See Anne Case, Darren Lubotsky & 
Christina Paxson, Economic Status and Health in Childhood: The Origins of the 
Gradient, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1308, 1310 (2002) (studying the relationship 
between household income and children’s health).  
 165. See Sarah Brown, Karl Taylor & Stephen Wheatley Price, Debt and 
Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Cost of Credit, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 642, 
656–58 (2005) (reporting results of ordered probit regression estimating 
association between psychological health and presence of unsecured debt, 
mortgage debt, and amount of debt burdens in British households).  
 166. Because the vast majority of people who file bankruptcy have very 
heavy debt burdens, the bankrupt population is of fairly limited utility for 
attempts to gauge how the harms of debt may vary with debt burdens and to 
identify the breakpoints at which debt produces reductions in endowments, 
alters preferences, or subjects people to limiting conditions.  
 167. For more information regarding the methodology of the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, see Lawless et al., supra note 12, at app. I. 
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multidimensional framework: endowments, conditions, and 
preferences. Such work would permit at least a partial 
application of that framework to the situations of real families.168  
Measures in the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project that 
could be used to assess the effects of high debt burdens on 
endowments are questions about mental and physical health, 
deprivations of health care, educational decisions (such as stopping 
an adult’s education or changing schools for children), and how 
individuals drew down on assets (such as retirement accounts or 
savings) or terminated such asset building strategies. The 
conditions measured included a number of indirect inquiries about 
labor market effects of debt. For example, debtors were asked if 
they missed work or were distracted at work because of their 
debts.169 Inquiries that might fit the criterion for preference 
measures include questions about savings habits, willingness to 
start a business, and willingness to file a future bankruptcy.  
The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project also collected data 
that could be used to assess effects of debt beyond harms to 
individuals. Such effects could be construed as externalities of debt 
or folded into the multidimensional approach to welfare as societal 
harms that then impact individual capabilities. For example, the 
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project asked a series of questions 
about how struggles with debt affected marital relations and 
marital status.170 Other inquiries could be used to probe 
intergenerational harms of debt, such as questions about whether 
children suffered privations from debt and how parental behaviors 
changed during the indebted period. The open-ended inquiries and 
debtors’ spontaneous comments during the interviews also provide 
insights on the interpersonal consequences of debt and the 
exclusion effects of debt-induced financial distress. Several debtors 
                                                                                                     
 168. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Francois 
Bourguignon’s model for welfare). 
 169. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Respondent W4_0905R, 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Question EMP10 (“I only missed a few days for 
lawyer and court hearings, but I missed a lot of work because of the depression 
that was caused by the financial troubles and the bankruptcy.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Respondent W5_0891B, 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Question SR09 (“We didn’t separate before the 
bankruptcy, but we did after we filed. It had really damaged our relationship 
and it could never be the same. I felt I had to move out and take my young son 
because it was effecting [sic] him so much too.”). 
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did describe family relationships that were damaged by their 
difficulties in managing their debts.171 Other parents talked about 
their children being unable to participate in school activities or 
athletics because of their financial distress.172 These findings, 
invisible in a metric of dollars, reveal how social exclusion and 
stigmatization may result from debt.  
Taken together, the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project data 
are a starting point to examine how debt may reduce well-being 
across multiple dimensions, including inhibiting productivity and 
constraining other basic capabilities, such as good health and 
stable social relationships. The data are concededly preliminary 
and limited on these points. Future studies of bankrupt households 
should consider adding additional dimensions and should develop 
improved measures of endowments, conditions, and preferences. 
The framework developed in this Article could be applied usefully 
to households with debt problems that have not filed bankruptcy, 
such as those who seek debt counseling or lose homes to 
foreclosure. In particular, one wishes for longitudinal data that 
could illuminate the trajectory of harms from unmanageable debt. 
It would be useful to know how harms to human welfare 
deteriorate (if they do so at all) as a family’s debt burdens exceed 
certain thresholds. The consequences of overindebtedness also may 
differ when an individual suffers an isolated bout of unmanageable 
debt versus a chronic situation, and when an individual rebounds 
from debt problems without intervention versus after intervention 
from bankruptcy or other formal processes.  
                                                                                                     
 171. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Respondent W3_0795B, 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Question ERD22 (“[My son] just discarded me. 
He won’t communicate with me.”); Respondent W2_0835C, Question ERD22, 
supra (“My kids lost total faith in me.”); Respondent W5_0891B, Question 
ERD22, supra (“People close to me didn’t know what to do to help and I lashed 
out at them from frustration and that was damaging.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Respondent W3_0637D, 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Question CHLD07 (“[The debt] caused anger 
because [the children] were unable to do athletics and school activities like their 
friends.”); Telephone Interview with Respondent W2_0970L, 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, Question PRV03 (reporting that children went without 
“things for school like band uniforms” because she could not afford them); 
Respondent W5_0891B, Question PRV03, supra (reporting that children went 
without “educational activities and arts and sports.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
This Article’s first goal is to highlight the paucity of empirical 
work measuring the harms of debt. Given the heavy debt burdens of 
families and the ferocity of policy debates about bankruptcy and 
credit regulation in the United States, this Article tries to motivate 
studies to assess whether the conjectured externalities of debt exist 
and to quantify those costs. This criticism accepts debt as a valid 
measure of welfare but notes the lack of recent or sophisticated 
efforts to measures the negative effects of unmanageable debt. The 
Article’s second goal is to expose the limitations of using financial 
measures as the space for assessing how overindebtedness harms 
well-being. Examining debt in a multidimensional space based on a 
capabilities approach to welfare is a superior approach to measuring 
the consequences of debt. This theoretical frame would incorporate 
elements that examined how debt reduces an individual’s 
endowments, produces undesirable preferences, and subjects 
individuals to societal conditions on achievement.  
Understanding the consequences of unmanageable debt would 
provide meaningful contributions to both theory and policy on 
bankruptcy and credit regulation. Better knowledge of the harms 
from overindebtedness may suggest that the means test in 
bankruptcy law, which conditions access to bankruptcy on financial 
metrics, is a poor instrument for evaluating one’s need to discharge 
debt.173 Quantifying the externalities of excessive debt would 
provide input on the costs of borrowing that could be incorporated 
into cost-benefit calculations about restrictions on credit. More 
fundamentally, when the association between debt and individual 
welfare is recast beyond a debt metric and, instead, encompasses 
human capabilities such as good health, adequate shelter, access to 
education, the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others, and a life free from undue anxiety and fear, the connection 
between well-being and consumer credit policy comes into sharper 
focus. This may encourage a richer conversation about the risks of 
fueling the economy with debt-funded consumption.  
                                                                                                     
 173. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Means Testing, http://www.justice.gov/ 
ust/eo/bapcpa/meanstesting.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (explaining the 
calculations in a bankruptcy means test) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
